We continue recent woik on the matching problem for firms and workers, and show that, for a suitable ordering, the set of stable matchii^^ is a lattice.
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2. Dracription (rf the model and notatioD. We will have finite sets of firms F and workers W. These may be lumped tc^ether as the set of players P -FU W. A firm hires a set of workers, with a salary (also called a "job description" in [S]) for each. We will use S for the set of all possible salaries. Hius, a firm hires a subset ot W x S, i.e., a member of 2^^^. A subset may be feasible for some firms and not for others. For each firm, there is a linear ordering over the feasible subsets, which indicates the firm's preferences. As in [S, note 7], we assume that a firm i & never indifferent between two different feasible subsets. In the same way, each worker works for a subset of F X S, and there are preference orderings associated with the feasible subsets for each worker.
Formally, a matching is a function f:P-* 2''^^ such that: Intuitively, (/, s) G f{j) means (if / G F) firm / hires worker j at salary s. Note that the values /(/), / G F, completely determine /(/), i G W, by (2.1).
For i e P, A <z P X S, C^iA) is the feasible subset of A that / likes best (the empty set is assumed to be feasible). Different preference orderings for / may yield the same C,, but the Cj contain all the important information. Therefore we state the axioms in terms of C, instead of in tenns of preferences: [A -U, s)).
(2.5) and (2.6) are clearly essential properties for any function that chooses the most desirable subset of a set. (2.7) says that anything that is wanted in addition to (y,,;) is stiU wanted if (j, s) is not available. In other words, members of CjiA) are wanted for their own sake, not because of potential benefits from interaction with other members.
We are using the minus sign for set-theoretic difference. A more traditional notation for A -(y, s) might be .^ \ {(j, s)}. However, there is no ambiguity, since members of A cannot be added or subtracted.
This paragr^h discusses the relation of our model to model III of [5] . It is not used in the rest of the paper. (2.7) is a special case of the substitutabiUty condition [5, p. 383] . To see this, let /^ = Q(>4), gi^ = A -(j, s) and let x^j vary over all memters of Cf. (A) -(j, s) . Proposition 2.2 will show that (2.5)-(2.7) actually imply the substitutabiUty condition (let A = g^U X/j, B -f^). Our model is slightly more general than model III, since we do not assume the gaieralized salary condition [5, p. 382] .
We shall make repeated use of the following ccmsequoices of (2.5)-(2.7). If / is a matching, and ij,sj ^ f(i), it may be the case that i would like to add (j, s) to his current involvements, possibly discarding some things that are presently part of /(/). The formal relation corresponding to / wanting {j, s) is (j, s) e Qifii) U (j\ s)).
We define / to be stable iff for all /, j G P, J e 5:
(2.8) says that no player wants to discard any of his partners in /. (2.9) follows immediately from (2.1) and (2.8) if (j, s) e /(/). In the interesting case, (/, s) «£ /(/), the content of (2.9) is that if / wants (j, s), then j does not want (/, s). This is equivalent to the definition of stability in [5, p. 382] .
If a matching is stable there is no way that a firm can make arrangements with a subset of the workers so that the firm and the subset are all happier than they were in the stable matching. We make this statement precise in Theorem 2.5. 
This says that if player / prefers his partners in matching g to his partners in matching /, there is a specific player-salary pair from g that he would like to add to those he gets under /.
PROOF. Since g(/) is preferred to /(/), and /(/) is preferred to any of its proper subsets, C,( 
PROOF. By (ii) and Lemma 2.4 we would have
(2.9) would require C//(y) U (i, *)) =/(j). But this is contradicted by ii, s) € fij). Q.E.D.
Thus firm i and workers T cannot all become happier by chai^g the matching among thcaiuelves, even if we allow members of T to res^ from firms, and allow / to lay off nonmembers of T. The proof of Theorem 2.5 can be repeated with F and fF exchanged to show no wOTker can form a profitable coalition with a subset of the firms.
However, tiie foUowii^ example Aows that we may have a unique stable matdiing, but the possibility that tiiejc are coaEtions involving sets of firms and workras to ptodwx a (mmstabte) matching in whkh all membo^ of the (»aUtion are happier. Indeed, in our exaiqple, the coalition conasts of idl firms and workos. 
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CHARLES BLAIR EXAMPLE 2.6. In this example and all subsequent ones, numbers will be firms, small letters will be workers, and S will consist of one member. Here we have three firms and three workers with the following preferences: Thus the first choice for firm 1 would be to hire a and b. Its worst choice (other than hiring nobody) would be to hire c.
It is easy to verify that the C, given by these preferences satisfy (2.5)-(2.7) and that the matching in which 1 hires a, 2 hires b and 3 hires c is stable. It can also be shown that this is the only stable matching, (b will never work for 1 in a stable matching, since he would always prefer to work for 2 instead, etc.)
However, the unstable matching in which 1 hires b and c, 2 hires a and c, and 3 hires a and b makes everybody happier. In the monogamous case, the stable matches correspond to the core of the game-those outcomes such that no coalition could make a biniUng contract among themselves to improve things for all members. This example shows that, in a multipartner setting, the core may be empty. Further assumptions about the preferences are needed if we want the core to be the set of stable outcomes here.
3. Existence of a stable matching. PROOF. We begin by showing that if /(/) = C,(^,) for all / e F and (3.1) is satisfied, then for all /, j ^ P:
) says that if ij,s) G A/, thenj does not want (/, s)\. Then, for any Le W, the new matching f'(i) = Cj(A<) where
2) is essentially the half of the stability condition (2.9) with /' a firm, j a worker]. If / satisfies (3.2) and Cj{f{j)) = f{j) then the conclusion of (3.2) can be strengthened to CjUU) U (/, s)) =/(;). Thus if /(/) = C,(^,) for all / e F and / satisfies (3.1), the only way that / could fail to be stable is if C^^ifiL)) ¥= f(L) for some Lew.
To construct the stable matching, we begin by taking A,= W X S tot aH i ^ F, and /(/) = Ci(Ai). (3.1) is satisfied vacuously. If / is not stable, there is an L e JF with /(L) # C[Xf{L)). We apply Lemma 3.1 to obtain A',, /'. Since /' satisfies (3.1), either /' is stable or there is an U with f'{L') # Q,(/(L')). Lemma 3.1 can then be applied to obtain /". This process can be repeated each time there is a nonstable matching. Since the sum of the sizes of the A^ decreases each time, we must eventually terminate with a stable matching. Q.E.D.
The idea behind this proof is the same as that in the original construction [2] of a stable matching in the monogamous case. To begin, all the players on one side are given their first choice. Then the preferences of the other players are consulted. It is established that certain players cannot be matched with certain others. Then one attempts to match the players on one side with their first choices among the remaining possibilities, and so forth. It is also the same as the construction in [6, pp. 53-54], except that there the A\ delete several members from J4, simultaneously. We have given the detailed proof here partly to stress the importance of the C, (as opposed to the preferences), partly because we wish to show later that the matching constructed here is the best stable matching for the firms.
4.
The lattice fracture (rf die set of staUe matdungs. In the monogamous case, the lattice is obtained by defining one stable matching as > another if every man is at least as happy in the first as in the second. A partial ordering on multi-partner matchings could be obtained by replacing "man" by "firm." In Example 5.1, we show that this ordering is not a lattice.
Instead, we will define f>g only if each firm wishes to keep its partners in /, even if all the partners in g were also made available, and would not wish to add any new partners. We will show that this more restrictive partial ordering is a lattice. Since it clearly specializes to the standard definition in the monogamous case, it seems to be the apprc^riate gaieralization. FormaUy, we define: E^FiNrnoN 4.1. Let /, g be matdungs which satisfy Qifii)) -/(/) and Cfigii)) = g(i) for aU / e F. Define /> g iff Ciif(i)Ug(i))=fii) tot aU i&F. f>f follows from tl» restriction on the domain of definition (the need for this restriction was pointed out by a referee). PROPOSITION 
Iff > g and g> h, then f>h.
PROOF. For I e F, q(f(i) U h{i) j e F, {i, s) G gU) . By (2.1) (j, s) e g(i) . C^{f{i) u g{i)) = g(/) and Proposition 2. The Gale-Shapley procedure [2] constructs a stable matching that is maximal in its lattice order. Since the construction in Theorem 3.2 is the multi-partner generalization, it should construct the maximal member in this ordering. 
Tlie stable matching g from Theorem 3.2 is thus constructed so that g(i) = C,(^,) for ^, such that h(i) c .4,. As in the preceding paragraph, this implies C^igii) U h(i)) = Cf(v4, U h(i)) = C,(^,) = gO), so g>h.
Q.E.D. Next we show that the partial ordering is a lattice. We wish to construct the least upper bound on stable matchings / and g. The matdiing wiiich gives every firm / its most preferred subset of /(/) U g(i) has most of the desired prcqierties but is not necessarily stable. However, a sequence of i»)difications can be perfcmned which terminate in a stable least upper bound.
We can obtain the great^t k>w«-b<Hmd on / and g by exchanging F and W throughout this construction, which (Theorem 4.5) rq>laces > l^ < .
For technical reasons, we will be concerned with the set of firms which, given a matching, are interested in a specified worker. For / a matching, j e W define 
Next we show that our first matching has several desirable properties. Our next lemma describes the modifications used and shows that the desired properties are preserved. Intuitively, we look at all the firms who are interested in a specific worker and have that worker join the new firms he find most attractive. (i, s) ). Since e is stable, (2.9) implies C,(e (/) U (;, s) 
PROOF OF (2) . UkeW-j, h'ik) c: hik) a C^ilik, h)). By Propositions 4.7 and /(;, A) ). Thus h'ij) c C//(y, A)). As above, h'iJ) c /(^; A') c /(;, A) so A'(7) c C,(/(y, A')) by Proposition 2.2.
PROOF OF (3) . The proof that (2) implies (3) in Lemma 4.9 is valid for any A. THEOREM 4.11. There is a stable least upper bound on f and g. PROOF. We construct a sequence of matchings A, A', A",... beginning with A(/) = Ciifii) U g(/)) and using Lemma 4.10. Each of the matchings satisfies properties (l)-(3). Property (1) ensures that the matchings are < any stable upper bound on / and g. Since A^ c A'^ in Lemma 4.10, it is easy to see that /, g < A < A' < A" < .... Property (3) implies that the matchings all satisfy (2.8). Thus, if the current matching A is not stable, there are /, j, s with (/, s) G Iij, A) and Cjihij) U (/, s)) = A(y) U (/, s) Tf t hij). We apply Lemma 4.10. A'^ has the new member ij, s) so the sum of the sizes of y4^ for all m G F has increased. The finiteness of P and S implies this process eventually terminates in a stable matching. (Another way to see that the process halts is to note that every firm is at least as happy in A' as in A, and at least one firm is strictly happier.) Q.E.D.
Thus we have established that the stable matchings are a lattice. It is puzzling that, although the existence proof Theorem 3.2 is essentially the same as in the monogamous case, the lattice operations are substantially more complicated. As previously mentioned, the multipartner lattice is not necessarily distributive (example 5.2), although the monogamous ones are. This su^ests the two situations are fundaroentally different, but some further insight would be helpful.
Two examples.
Recall our conventions used in Example 2.6. As mentioned at the beginning of §4, a partial ordering in which f^giS every firm prefers its set of partners under / to its partners under g is not a lattice. EXAMPLE 5.1. We consider 13 firms and 12 workers with the following preferences: 
